POLITICAL and NATIONAL RECONCILIATION
With dialogue and national reconciliation looming, albeit at an indeterminate distance, questions have been asked about the difference between Political Reconciliation and National Reconciliation. Is there a difference?
Special Report October 2002
APPENDIX II: POLITICAL & NATIONAL RECONCILIATION
by Dr. Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe
With dialogue and national reconciliation looming, albeit at an indeterminate distance, questions have been asked about the difference between Political Reconciliation and National Reconciliation. Is there a difference?
In essence and in the conceptual, they are not different because reconciliation means to bring people or forces divided by interests and ideology, and which have moreover taken up contradictory or opposing positions, together. Reconciliation also implies seeking a middle or a common ground, based on compromise.
In context however, political reconciliation, narrowly defined, might in Burma mean reconciliation between ethnic Burmese (or Burman) protagonists – for e.g., between Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD on the one hand, and the ruling generals on the other.
Whereas national reconciliation might, in the same context, mean arriving at a settlement to resolve the conflict between the non- Burman ethnics – the ethnic nationalities (Mon, Karen, Shan, Chin, etc.) – and the state, dominated largely by ethnic-Burman military men (since 1962).
In a sense, national reconciliation is broader, especially in the Burma context. It is, in a lot of ways, a search for a formula and ideology of national unity that will provide all people of Burma with freedoms to contribute to the well-being and development of the country, and develop local communities, ethnically or otherwise defined.
Political Reconciliation, Narrowly Defined
It would seem that political reconciliation could be more easily affected among ethnic-Burman, comprising the majority, because “blood is thicker than water”, and that nothing would change in such an instance for the non-Burman ethnic nationalities. That is, the ethnic nationalities will continue to be oppressed by a reconciled Burman entity, and the Burmanization policy would still be implemented.
On second thought, this view can be regarded as too simplistic. Where power or power contestation is concerned, power is power, and ethnic affiliations become irrelevant. If we look at politics in non-democratic, but homogeneous, states and countries, there is as much intra-ethnic violence in situations where there are fierce contestations for power.
The military coup in Burma in 1962 was immediately challenged by mainly ethnic-Burman student leaders. This was followed by successive anti-military protests till the mid-1970s. In 1988, thousands of ethnic-Burmese rose up to protest military rule and were mercilessly mowed down by the military’s massed fire-power. What mattered was power, pure and simple, nothing else.
The conflict among ethnic-Burmans is intensely political as it is essentially about power, and as importantly, it is about how power is exercised and by whom, and who is excluded and put at the mercy of power-holders. The majority of ethnic-Burmese are determinedly opposed to the military holding exclusive power and their arbitrary and selfish use of said power at the expense of the many.
The pertinent question then is: Is political reconciliation between ethnic-Burmese on the basis of “blood being thicker than water,” possible or likely?
The answer would be ‘yes’ if the majority of ethnic-Burman and their leaders, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, were reconciled to living under the oppressive rule of the military for several more decades. That is, they will have to give up all freedom, rights, individual dignity and human (democratic) values to continue the oppression of ethnic nationalities. The oppression by one ethnic nation of another is not cost free, on the contrary it does not benefit anyone. Oppression is very expensive for the oppressor nation and for the whole country, as the history of independent Burma starkly shows.
But will some sort of compromise not be necessary between the ethnic-Burmese – one may ask, for the sake of political reconciliation? Certainly, but not exclusive of national reconciliation, broadly defined.
National Reconciliation, Broadly Defined
National reconciliation, as earlier stated, is broader than political reconciliation, as it applies to the relation of the state with, in particular, the various or many ethnic segments that make up the whole country. National Reconciliation is at the core of Burma’s problems as well as an integral part of the solution.
Burma in the modern or post-1948 sense, rests on the Panglong Accord signed in February 1947 between the AFPFL (Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League) led by U Aung San and Shan princes and leaders of the Frontier Areas. Panglong represents the union of territories -- i.e., of Ministerial Burma and the Frontier Areas. Pyidaungzu, the Burmese word for the Union means a “coming together of national states.” The aim of Panglong was to jointly win freedom of Ministerial Burma and the Frontier Areas from British rule, and the main principle involved was the autonomy or freedom of all the national states of the Pyidaungzu, i.e., a union that is federal in form.
The founding principle of modern Burma, the Panglong Spirit, has yet to be honoured, although lip-service has been regularly and routinely paid to it by successive military juntas. The restoration of the Panglong Spirit lies therefore at the core of national reconciliation for this spirit not only represents the founding principle of Burma, but is the key to the reconciliation of all the ethnic segments and people of Burma, i.e., political reconciliation broadly defined.
In the Burma context, National Reconciliation and Political Reconciliation are two sides of the same coin, and one merges into the other.
Given, however, the large gap between significant political stakeholders in Burma – the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the SPDC, and the ethnic nationalities – on how Political and National Reconciliation is to be achieved, the question of compromise, i.e., who will concede what in the interest of generations to come, must be seriously considered by the current leaders of Burma. The future lies in their hands.
The future does not lie in a vacuum. What Burma will become must be decided here and now, by the actions, political skills the intellectual maturity, and the wisdom of the present crop of leaders.
ALTSEAN-Burma: Published 13 October 2002